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Abstract
Income transfers may generate work disincentives: if certain income payments are 
stopped when individuals (re)enter employment, this creates disincentives for taking em-
ployment – so called “unemployment trap”. To make work pay, several countries have 
introduced policies – financial incentives – which enhance employment opportunities 
for marginal groups in the labor market. Such policies increase in-work incomes and so 
improve work incentives for those receiving only out-of-work incomes. This paper tries 
to shed light on two questions, first being how does “making work pay” work in Slov-
enia, compared OECD countries, and the second, should Slovenia introduce earnings 
supplements or other in-work arrangements in tackling possible unemployment trap. 
According to international comparison Slovenia does not “step-out”, when we look at 
net replacement rates. Slovenia, however, has not introduced a single active labor pro-
grams that would stimulate directly and financially unemployed to join (official) em-
ployment, even though a lower paid job. In the paper we suggest the implementation 
of some kind of in-work arrangement at least for those, who are potentially less stimu-
lated to reemploy.
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1 Introduction
Income transfers may generate work disincentives: if certain income payments are 
stopped when individuals (re)enter employment, this creates disincentives for taking a job. 
This is the so called “unemployment trap.” According to OECD (2004a), such disincen-
tives are indeed present for many persons with low potential wages, particularly if they 
have children or are second earners in the family.1 While non-employment benefits (such 
as benefits from unemployment insurance or assistance) need to ensure income adequate 
consumption smoothing, setting such benefits at a too high level may trap families in a 
cycle of dependency, as taking a job brings little or no extra income. Another consequence 
of high non-employment benefits is an upward pressure on wages.
A tax burden on labor is also an important factor as it is of the most direct ways to 
influence the poverty and unemployment rate. When taxes on labor are introduced the 
tax wedge between labor costs paid by employer (gross wage) and net wage received by 
employee appears. According to OECD (2004b) tax wedge on labor is the difference be-
tween what employers pay out in wages and social security charges and what employees 
take home after tax, taken into account also social security deductions and cash benefits. 
OECD and IMF studies have shown that higher taxes on labor, including unemployment 
benefit contributions, significantly increase unemployment (see OECD, 2004 and IMF, 
2003). The problem is indeed relevant for Slovenia – data shows that Slovenia has one of 
the highest tax burden on labor in EU, immediately after Belgium and Germany, respect-
fully (Dolenc and Vodopivec, 2005).
To make work pay, several countries have introduced policies – financial incentives – 
which enhance employment opportunities for marginal groups in the labor market. These 
policies are aimed to increase in-work incomes and improve work incentives for those re-
ceiving only out-of-work incomes. In the European Employment Strategy ‘making work 
pay’ policies are a key issue for reducing benefit dependency and increasing labor market 
participation (De Lathouwer, 2004). 
European Commission reports that many EU member states are committed to improve 
the combined impact of taxes and benefits on employment and their link with activation. 
There is also a more visible commitment to tackle the issue of working poor through in-
work benefits and rises in minimum wages. Improving work incentives in benefit sys-
tems, including eligibility rules and related financial incentives are, however, less force-
fully addressed (for details see European Commission, 2005).
This paper is a result of a preliminary study on the subject and as such tries to shed 
light on the following questions: 1. How does “making work pay” work in Slovenia, com-
pared OECD countries? 2. What are possible solutions of an eventual unemployment trap 
problem in Slovenia?
The main findings of the paper are as follows. According to international comparison 
Slovenia does not “step-out”, when we look at financial incentives to return to employ-
ment. In tackling possible unemployment trap some OECD and EU countries have intro-
duced earnings supplements to attract unemployed to re-activate; several policy measures 
1 Many other OECD studies deal with this problem, see e.g. OECD (1997, 1999a, 1999b)
343
P. Dolenc, M. Vodopivec: Does Work Pay in Slovenia?
Financial Theory and Practice 29 (4), 341-362 (2005)
are possible, all having their advantages and disadvantages. Slovenia, however, has not 
introduced a single active labor programs that would stimulate directly and financially 
unemployed to join (official) employment, even though a lower paid job. The problem is 
especially evident for some groups of unemployed (those who have children, etc.). 
The paper is organized as follows. In the second chapter we present methodology and 
data sources. The third and fourth chapter deals with the subject in OECD area, whereas 
fifth and sixth chapter is concentrated on Slovenia and the comparison of Slovenian case 
with OECD examples. We then sum up and suggest some basic policy measures.
2 Methodology and data sources
2.1 Methodology
There are two possible (yet alternative) indicators, how to measure financial effect of 
re-employment or efficiency of “making work pay”. One – used e.g. by Immervoll and 
O’Donoghue (2003) or Vodopivec (1998) – is so called net replacement rate (NRR). NRR 
is defined as ratio of net income while out of work (ynetA) divided by net income while in 
work (ynetB), so:
 
NRR
y
y
netA
netB

 
. (1)
If net replacement rate exceeds 100%, the unemployed person is not expected (at least 
not on short-term basis) to be encouraged to move from unemployment, because in-work 
earnings are smaller than out-of-work incomes or (alternatively) when moving to unem-
ployment the incomes would increase and not (as usually) decrease.
Carone, Salomäki, Immervoll and Paturot (2003) for this purpose suggest an alter-
native indicator, marginal effective tax rate (METR). The concept of METR is not new, 
though; it was already mentioned in 1978 (see Meade, 1978) and later-on additionally ex-
plained by Brandford and Fullerton (1981). 
There are three different METRs, but with respect to unemployment trap, we con-
sider marginal effective tax rate for unemployed person (METRUT). The parameter aims 
to measure the short-term financial incentives to move from unemployment (where out-
of-work incomes are received) into paid employment and is defined as the rate at which 
taxes increase and benefits (mainly unemployment insurance benefits) decrease as an un-
employed person takes up a job. The level of METRUT is subject to different family types 
and earnings before and after re-employment. Formally METRUT is computed as:2
 
METR
y
yUT
net
gross
 1
Δ
Δ  . (2)
2 Δygross are the additional pre-tax earnings when moving from unemployment and Δynet is the change in net 
income obtained after taxes and benefits. The change in gross earnings between labor market status A (unemployed
 – ygrossB) and B (employed – ygrossB) is 
Δy y ygross grossB grossA  and the net earnings change is 
Δy y y y t b y t bnet netB netA grossB B B grossA A A       ( ) ( ) where t denotes total taxes, b denotes total benefits 
and net refers to net (after tax and benefits) earnings
344
P. Dolenc, M. Vodopivec: Does Work Pay in Slovenia?
Financial Theory and Practice 29 (4), 341-362 (2005)
The parameter quantifies to what extent the tax-benefit system contributes to the un-
employment trap in cases where unemployed person receives out-of-work incomes.
Although net replacement rate and marginal effective tax rate are connected with clear 
relationship (for details see OECD, 1998), there is a major conceptual difference between 
the two measures: METR is for the people that move from unemployment (having some 
earlier earnings that could determine unemployment benefits) to employment and NRR 
is used vice versa (from employment to unemployment).
2.2 Data sources
The analysis was based on two sources of data:
•  For international comparison of NRR and METRUT we used data from on-going joint 
European Commission/OECD project, aimed at monitoring the direct influence of 
tax and benefit instruments on household incomes. The data for year 2001 is pre-
sented by Carone et al. (2003).
•  For calculations of METR and NRR in Slovenia the official government data on av-
erage, minimum and guaranteed wage and levels of unemployment and social as-
sistance was used. The data was collected for the year 2004.
3  Overview of data – net replacement and marginal effective tax rates in OECD 
countries
In most OECD countries unemployed persons receive (at least at the beginning of 
their unemployment) unemployment insurance benefits and – after the eligibility for 
unemployment insurance benefit expires3 – usually also unemployment assistance ben-
efits. If they move from unemployment, they have some opportunity costs: they usually 
lose these benefits, they have to pay transportation costs, they receive wage – because 
those people are usually those with little work experience and/or low skills, they com-
monly receive minimum wage – but they have to pay personal income taxes, social se-
curity contributions etc. Therefore not all are unconditionally prepared to take the job 
(if available). The problem is especially evident for those who had high wage before 
unemployment (relatively to the offered wage, if moved from unemployment) because 
they usually receive relatively high unemployment insurance benefits. The level of net 
replacement rate and marginal effective tax rate for unemployed person is of course 
subject to different parameters: different family types and earnings before and after re-
employment etc.
European and OECD countries have different tax systems and cope differently with 
unemployment. They also have different views on “making work pay” policy. However, 
some common conclusions could be drawn from results of joint European Commission/
OECD project. These results (marginal effective tax rates for unemployed persons and net 
replacements rates) are presented in tables 1,2 and 3 and figures 1,2 and 3 (different types 
of families and employment levels after reemployment are taken into consideration).
3 The length is different in different countries. Unemployment insurance benefit and/or unemployment / soci-
al assistance benefit
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How to explain METRUT? METRUT, close to – say – 90% means that short-term net fi-
nancial reward for taking up a job is only 10% of gross earnings. If we look at numbers in 
table 1 and 2, METRUT is higher on average (at a certain level of previous work wage) if re-
employment wage level is lower. This is logical. In most countries out-of-work incomes4 
depend on previous wages. Unemployed with high previous wage usually receive a high-
er benefit, which makes re-employment less attractive, especially if offered low wage em-
ployment. Of course, family type plays an important role, too (see figure 1b and 2b).
Figure 1a  and 1b Median unemployment trap indicator (METRUT) for an unemployed 
person with previous work wage level of 67% of APW wage with respect to 
different family types and levels of wage after re-employment in 2002 (in %)
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4 Table 1-3 also contain data for Slovenia, but table 5 offers a bit more detailed insight into the subject.
Wage after re-employment (as a % of APW wage)
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There are some countries and some wage/family type combinations, where METRUT 
jumps over 100%. Here the unemployed (at least on short-term basis and taken in mind 
only financial and not “personal” (personal pride, feeling of social importance…) effects) 
is not stimulated to take a job.
Figure 2a  and 2b Median unemployment trap indicator (METRUT) for an unemployed 
person with previous work wage level of 100% of APW wage with respect to 
different family types and levels of wage after re-employment in 2002 (in %)
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Similar conclusions as for marginal effective tax rates for unemployed persons can be 
drawn also for net replacement rates (table 3 and figure 3). On average and irrespectively 
the family type, net replacement rate is smaller for those with higher pre-unemployment 
wage; when moved to unemployment those with lowest pre-unemployment wage lose least 
(financially). On average (all countries and family type average) those with pre-unemploy-
ment wage at the level of 50% lose 10% of previous income, whereas those with pre-un-
employment wage at the level of 150% lose almost 40% of previous income. Although 
paradoxically in some countries for some family types net replacement rate is more than 
100%, which means that with loosing work people actually get higher incomes. 
Figure 3a  and 3b Median net replacement rates for unemployed persons moving to 
unemployment with respect to different family types and levels of wage after 
re-employment in 2002 (in %)
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It should be noted, however, that these figures are calculated on the first month of un-
employment, therefore these figures should be viewed with caution. Carone et al. (2004) 
warn that computed figures represent only “upper-bound” as in many countries unem-
ployment insurance benefits and/or unemployment/social assistance benefits are reduced 
or abolished over time. But still, if we take an example of currently unemployed person 
with previous wage level at 100% of APW wage and if he/she takes a comparable job 
(as before unemployment), he/she is effectively taxed away on average between 20-30% 
(different levels are because of different family types). Financial effect of taking full-time 
job is not significant; therefore some other mechanisms to attract reemployment should 
be taken into consideration.
4 Experience of OECD countries with “making-work-pay” policies 
Why are policies to “make work pay” important in any country? On our opinion are 
such policies an effective tool to reduce unemployment in the economy with relatively 
low financial stake for the budget. Other policy measures aimed to lower unemployment 
might not be so effective. For example, empirical studies that tried to shed light on effects 
of tax reduction on general unemployment level in the economy came up with mixed re-
sults. Daveri’s cross country analysis (2001) showed that unemployment is not neces-
sary high/low in countries in countries where labor tax rates are high/low. Further, with-
in-country time correlation between labor taxes and unemployment is stronger for some 
countries (such as Germany, France, Spain, Italy) than for others (the US and UK). Sim-
ilar was reported by Turvainen (1994): in the US and UK real wage resistance is low, so 
that taxes do not significantly affect labor costs and thus unemployment. Furthermore, 
Calmfors and Nymoen (1990) find only short-run impact of the tax wedge on wages in 
Denmark, Sweden and Norway, while Eriksson et al. (1990) find only weak long-run link 
between the tax wedge and wages for Finland. Prescott (2004) found that by reducing the 
effective marginal tax rate on labor and moving toward retirement systems with the prop-
erty that benefits on margin increase proportionally to contributions. On the other hand 
Dolando et al. (1986), and Browne and McGettigan (1993) find that rise in tax wedge ex-
plains to some extent the increase in unemployment respectively for Spain and Ireland. 
In addition Andersen and Risager (1990) find significant effect of payroll taxes on wages 
in Denmark while Noghadam (1994) argues that a reduction in employers’ payroll taxes 
in France will reduce unemployment.
Therefore a very important policy measure are policies focused on the goal to “make 
work pay”, because they can be fairly focused on particular problems or groups of unem-
ployed. But do policies to “make work pay” actually work? These policies often involve 
large amounts of financial resources to have a series of side effects throughout the econ-
omy. Pearson and Scarpetta (2000) argue that these policies have not only effects on em-
ployment, but also other effects. For example, policies that reduce the cost of low-skilled 
work lead to reductions in the prices charged by the employers of low-skilled labor for 
their output. Consumer demand for such goods and services could then rise in compari-
son with those produced with more highly skilled labor and the increased demand may 
give a further boost to demand for (and wages paid to) low-skilled work.
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This is pointed out also by Phelps (2000) who argues that there are potentially im-
portant social and economic externalities associated with having a full-time job. A job is 
often good for individuals in terms of physical and mental health; raising self-esteem and 
well-being by making them feel more included in society. Bringing hitherto marginal-
ized groups of society, including those who are active in undeclared working sphere into 
mainstream economic activities may generate beneficial outcomes for society as a whole. 
However, Pearson and Scarpetta (2000) find it is hard to find quantitative evidence of such 
effects and interpret them.
In spite of this fact, some empirical results are still applicable. Tax credit was in-
troduced – for example – in the United States as The Earned-Income Tax Credit (EITC) 
scheme and in the United Kingdom as The Working Families Tax Credit (WFTC). Under 
this program families with low-paid earner(s) and children can benefit from the credit so 
that marginal and average effective tax rates fell significantly, therefore their incentive to 
re-employ is higher. Hotz and Scholz (2000) found evidence that earned income tax credit 
in the United States promotes employment. Dilnot and McGrae (2000) made simulations 
for United Kingdom – they suggest that the expansion of the “make work pay” program 
will promote employment (10.000 to 100.000 people could find work). Similar results 
were found by Greenwood and Voyer (2000), and Fitoussi (2000) who estimated effects 
of “make work pay” policies for Canada and France, respectfully. 
Complementary social benefits to work were introduced – for example – in Belgium 
(see De Lathouwer, 2004) as an answer to the necessity for the unemployed to gain work 
experience and the need to provide greater financial incentives to unemployed. The un-
employed person who has taken up a low paid job (maybe also part-time job) receives 
unemployment benefit (direct cash transfer) as a wage subsidy. The system has proven to 
be very successful in Belgium because it attracted many unemployed to take a low paid 
and/or part-time job, for which they otherwise would not be interested. This is usually 
only one step into highly paid and/or full-time job.
Similar policy measures were introduced also in Canada; two financial incentive pro-
grams were introduced to encourage employment: self-sufficiency project and earnings 
supplement project. The first program makes generous payments directly to social assist-
ance recipients who go to work full-time. The program was found to be very effective, 
as about a third of the long-term single-parent welfare recipients responded to the self-
sufficiency project supplement offer by leaving welfare for full-time work (Greenwood 
and Voyer, 2000). The alternative program, earning supplement program, provides indi-
viduals with a “top-up” wage to supplement employment earnings for those with low-
entry wages. This enables individuals to maintain a targeted income level. Participants 
must work for a set amount of time to qualify (e.g., 30 hours per week). Such programs 
are designed to provide a short period of enhanced income, based on the assumption that 
program participants will be in a better position to become self-sufficient when the sup-
plement ends (for details see Card and Robins, 1996 and Mijanovich and Long, 1995). 
This program, as reported by Tattrie (1999), was not very successful. Only 41% of those 
who were asked to take a part in the study agreed to participate; of those, only 4.7% re-
turned to work within 12 weeks, experienced an earnings loss and received a supple-
ment payment. Tattrie supposes that the inefficiency of the program is due to reluctance 
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of unemployed to leave existing long-term employment relationships for new risky jobs 
for which they would receive a supplement for only a temporary period of time or dif-
ficulty in finding jobs.
Earnings supplements are used also in the United States, but here the instrument is 
combined with negative marginal tax rate or a marginal subsidy rate. The program pro-
vides strong work incentives for very low-wage or low-earnings workers. For them a sup-
plement is added to their total earnings, and each additional dollar earned is supplemented 
as well. For workers above the maximum supplement point but below the poverty line, a 
supplement is also added to total earnings, but marginal earnings are subject to a tax rate 
(Haveman, 1996). Scholz (1995) estimated that the aggregate increase in hours generated 
by increased labor force participation was roughly 74 million hours yearly.
Another policy measure to create greater financial incentives for the unemployed and 
to make work more financial attractive in general are reductions of employee’s social con-
tributions or personal income tax reduction. In France low paid are entitled to exemp-
tion from family contributions and reduction of social security contribution (Pearson and 
Scarpetta, 2000). The rebate is proportional to the number of hours worked (so as not to 
unduly favor part-time job) and applicable for up to 1,3 times the minimum wage. Other 
tax exemptions are targeted to specific groups, including exemptions for part-time work, 
first-hires and youth employment, and exemptions related to skill training contracts and 
apprentices. Even high short-term financial cost of such program (0.6% of GDP) Malin-
vaud’s simulation showed that in the long run this exemptions will contribute to the crea-
tion of about 350 000 jobs (Malinvaud, 1998 and Fitoussi, 2000)
5 Financial re-employment incentives in Slovenia – a descriptive analysis
In Slovenia the law gives unemployed workers the right to unemployment compen-
sation, unemployment assistance, training and health and old-age insurance. Besides that 
needy individuals are eligible to social assistance programs. Characteristics of unemploy-
ment insurance and social assistance programs are listed in Table 4.
Table 5 shows net replacement rates in Slovenia for different family types and levels 
of wage before unemployment.5 Regarding the fact that unemployed are entitled to unem-
ployment compensation at a level of 70% and 60% of wage before unemployment in first 
3 months and after first 3 months, respectively, net replacement rates suit these figures. In 
most cases, net replacement rates are not far from 70% and 60%; the difference appears 
because we presumed that taxpayers try to take most of possible tax deductions.6 Those, 
however, who maintain their children and/or spouse, lose significantly less; net replace-
ment rate is more than 90%. This is because the tax reduction is quite substantial in these 
cases. This fact is consistent with results reported by Vodopivec (1998). He stresses that 
for families with two of more children where both parents are unemployed, the effective 
tax rate on the employment of one of the parents – if the parent is a minimum-wage earn-
er – is 100%. Under those circumstances employment of the parents has no effect on the 
disposable income of the family.
5 That is, it was assumed they all account for general tax deduction at the maximum level – 3% of tax base
6 Before unemployment.
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Table 4 Unemployment and social assistance benefits in Slovenia
Unemployment insurance Social assistance
Unemployment compensation Unemployment 
assistance
Social assistance in casha
Eligibility Several conditions:
•  minimum contribution period of 9 
months (for uninterrupted service) 
or 12 months (for interrupted 
service).
•  the person must register as 
unemployed within 30 days 
of the date of termination of 
employment. 
•  the reason for termination of 
employment is either layoff or 
bankruptcy (quitters are thus 
disqualified).
Income-tested. If 
actual income per 
family member 
is below the 
threshold of 80 
percent of the 
guaranteed wage.
Income-tested. The threshold income is, in terms 
of guaranteed wage, 
•  100% for the first adult in the family,
•  70% for second and other adults in the family,
•  30% for a school-attending child below 18.
Property considered on ad-hoc basis by reducing 
the entitlement as calculated from incomes. 
Other provisions:
•  for unemployed, registration at employment 
office required;
•  benefit can be conditioned by a contract 
specifying the actions to be taken by the 
recipient (such as health treatment, participation 
in public works).
Exceptions are permissible, at the discretion of the 
center for social work.
Benefit 
level
70 percent in the first three months, 
60 percent thereafter, of the average 
monthly wage in the last three 
months of employment.
80 percent of the 
guaranteed wage.
Difference between the income threshold and 
the income of the family (the sum of income of 
all family members plus assessed incomes from 
property). Payable monthly in cash, except in 
special circumstances when converted to coupons 
or reimbursement of bills.
Additional 
benefits 
Participation in training,
public works
Pension and health insurance
Participation in 
training, public 
works
Pension and 
health insurance
Housing subsidy, if recipient rents an apartment.
Duration 
of benefit
3 to 24 months, depending on years 
of service.
Extendable for up to 3 years for 
people before pension able age.
After employment of nine months, 
original terms for duration apply if 
the person reenters unemployment.
Maximum of 6 
months.
Maximum of 6 months. Renewable.
Conditions 
for taking 
away the 
benefit 
after being 
awarded
If turning down a job offer, training 
or other active labor market 
programs.
Maximum duration shortened 
for the period when casual 
earnings above 160 percent of the 
guaranteed wage.
Same as for 
unemployment 
compensation.
Not clear. Recipient must report changes of 
relevant circumstances
a Social assistance as a supplementary source of income. There is also social assistance as the 
sole source of income, restricted to persons permanently unable to work and those above 60 without 
other income sources. 
Source: Vodopivec (1998), Stanovnik, Čok and Stropnik (2004).
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Table 5  Net replacement rates for employed persons moving to unemployment with 
respect to different family types and levels of wage before unemployment, 
Slovenia in 2004 (in %) a
Type of household/family
Single adult 
without children
Single-parent 
family with 2 
children 
One-earner 
family with
 2 childrenb
Two-earner 
family with 
2 childrenb, c
A. Net replacement rates during the first 3 months of unemployment
Minimum-wage earners 71 93 94 73
Average-wage earners 73 72 72 72
B. Net replacement rates during unemployment compensation after the first 3 months
Minimum-wage earners 62 91 93 67
Average-wage earners 63 63 64 62
C. Net replacement rates during unemployment assistance
Minimum-wage earners 44 37 30 42
Average-wage earners 20 18 18 19
D. Net replacement rates during social assistance
Minimum-wage earners 45 72 81 56
Average-wage earners 20 36 48 25
Notes:
a Net replacement rate is defined as the percent of net benefits received when breadwinners are 
unemployed, of wages earned when breadwinners work (“net” refers to disposable income – paid after 
taxes and contributions). It is assumed that all possible tax deductions are reported (general tax dedu-
ction at the level of 3% of tax base).
b Both children are assumed to be between 15 and 18 years old.
c Each adult “reports” one child as a tax deduction.
Source: Table 3, own calculations.
When the eligibility to receive unemployment compensation expires (or for those 
who were not applicable at all), the net replacement rate is significantly lower; about 38% 
and 64% for minimum-wage earners eligible to unemployment assistance and social se-
curity, respectively. Average-wage earners these net replacement rates are even lower, 
19% and 32% for those eligible to unemployment assistance and social security, respec-
tively. These results are similar to those reported by Vodopivec (1998) for Slovenia in 
1996. He also finds that replacement rates under unemployment insurance are generally 
higher than those under social assistance. 
Although we find that for selected groups of people net replacement rates are all 
below 100%, these results have to be viewed with caution. It is evident that workers 
with maintained children and/or spouse do not loose much during the period they re-
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ceive unemployment compensation. It is expected they would not be unconditional-
ly prepared to take again the job, if they received, say, 10% more income. This group 
of people is probably the most exposed to unemployment trap. Similar would be for 
highly paid workers, who would probably not be interested to take a low paid job until 
receiving unemployment compensation. With this respect, Van Ours and Vodopivec 
(2004) find empirical evidence for Slovenia that there are differences between gender 
in the probability of reemployment. Males with at least one dependent family member 
are more likely exit from unemployment after unemployment benefits expire. On the 
other hand, females are less likely to exit from unemployment – they are more likely 
to stay unemployed.
6 A comparative analysis of financial re-employment incentives in Slovenia and OECD
In the previous chapter we analyzed the reemployment incentives in Slovenia, but 
purely descriptive analysis does not offer a thorough overview of the subject. This chap-
ter is a comparative analysis of reemployment incentives in Slovenia and OECD.
Tables 1 to 3 contain not only data for OECD countries, but also comparative data for 
Slovenia (in bold). On the first sight these results show that Slovenia does not “step-out” 
when compared to OECD countries. In Slovenia average net replacement rate for aver-
age-wage earners and minimum-wage earners are fairly similar, 92% and 75%, respec-
tively (see section 3 for comparison). 
As for marginal effective tax rate is concerned regardless the previous work wage 
level, the marginal effective tax rate for reemployment wage at the level of 100% of av-
erage production worker wage in OECD (average of all members) and Slovenia is very 
close (about 66% for unemployed person with previous work wage level of 67% of aver-
age production worker and 74% for unemployed person with previous work wage level 
of 100% of average production worker). For reemployment wage at the level of mini-
mum wage, the marginal effective tax rate is significantly lower in Slovenia, though (for 
12 to 14 % pts.).
On the other hand, sole comparison with OECD average could be misleading – 
OECD is a group of different and is a way hardly comparative countries. Therefore 
it may be worthwhile to compare the study results with those countries that are most 
similar to Slovenia. Hungary – for example – is also a transition country, which en-
tered EU in 2004 and has similar unemployment rate as Slovenia, roughly fewer than 
6% (see Dolenc and Vodopivec, 2005). When looking at net replacement rate, Slovenia 
has – on average – significantly higher net replacement rate – overall average is 15% 
pts. higher as in Hungary, so one could interpret this result that in Hungary financial 
incentives to reemploy are higher than in Slovenia causing higher employment rate and 
lower unemployment rate. As marginal effective rate is concerned, average earners in 
Hungary are financially more stimulated to take a (comparative to before unemploy-
ment) job, whereas below-average earners have similar stimulus as in Slovenia. Hun-
gary – however – has lower employment rate, but this is probably due to other, struc-
tural factors rater that net replacement rate. Dolenc and Vodopivec (2005) found in 
their analysis of tax wedge on labor that although Hungary and Slovenia have similar 
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tax policies concerning labor taxation and also have similar unemployment rate (ac-
cording to ILO classification) their employment rates differ significantly. 
Slovenia is often compared to Ireland as well, because of the size and openness of the 
economy and other factors. In fact, Slovenia and Ireland are fairly similar with respect to 
employment rate (they both have employment rate at the level of approximately 65%), but 
Ireland has somewhat lower unemployment rate (approximately 4.3%) – see Dolenc and 
Vodopivec (2005). As financial aspects of reemployment incentives are concerned in Ire-
land unemployed get lower unemployment support on average than in Slovenia, because 
they lose more than 30% of what they have earned prior to the unemployment. They are 
also more financially stimulated to take again the job, because they earn on average 37% 
more than they received as unemployed (concrete figures are of course subject to family 
type and wage level before and after unemployment). In spite of this differences unem-
ployment rate (and employment rate) – as mentioned – is not really that much different 
in Slovenia compared to Ireland.
Another comparison is interesting in this regard – a comparison to Austria. Slove-
nia and Austria have fairly similar figures when we take into consideration financial in-
centives to re-employ, either net replacement rate or marginal effective tax rate. Overall 
average net replacement rate in Austria is 77% (2% pts. lower than in Slovenia), where-
as average marginal effective tax rate is 74% and 81% for 67% APW worker and 100% 
APW worker, respectively. Austria has, however, lower unemployment rate and higher 
employment rate.
These results show that when analyzing financial incentives to work a simple cross-
country analysis would not be enough because there are several other factors influenc-
ing the labor market (the level of shadow economy, willingness to work, flexibility of 
workers to take half time job, etc.). It is – however – evident, that Slovenia does not 
“step-out” in financial incentives to work, especially if compared to similar economies 
in the region. 
7 Conclusions and some policy considerations 
We showed above that European and OECD countries have different tax systems 
and cope differently with unemployment. There are some countries and some wage/fam-
ily type combinations, where unemployment trap indicator or net replacement rate jumps 
over 100%. Here the unemployed are not stimulated to take a job.7
Compared to OECD countries Slovenia does not “stick-out” when reemployment 
incentives are concerned. We find, however, that there are some groups of unemployed 
who are potentially less stimulated to reemploy. For unemployed with dependent fami-
ly members and low-income potential net replacement rate is fairly high (almost 100%). 
Results of Van Ours and Vodopivec (2004) about differences between gender in the prob-
ability of reemployment are applicable here: also in Slovenia women may be more stim-
ulated to stay at home. 
7 At least on a short-term basis and bearing in mind only financial and not affective (personal pride, feeling of 
social importance…) factors.
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How to improve (re)employment incentives in Slovenia? Our country has intro-
duced active labor market programs to increase employment opportunities for unem-
ployed, especially marginal groups (young inexperienced people, elderly people, etc.). 
This program, however, does not include one direct financial incentive for unemployed 
(for example, a earnings supplement) to directly attract people with high replacement 
rate to join employment. Therefore Slovenia could consider introducing some sort of 
“in-work” arrangements that increase net income from low paid work such as most of 
continental welfare states have done in the nineties. Social benefits to work have proven 
to be a success in Belgium, where unemployed with low wage potential (and high mar-
ginal effective tax rate) became stimulated to take any kind of work, even though less 
paid. Similar arrangement – earning supplements – have proved to be successful in the 
US and UK. Empirical results for different European countries and the US have shown 
that such measures would have some positive effects on employment, and the earnings 
and incomes of poor families, and at the same time would probably cause at little or no 
net increase in the cost of government transfers. 
For Slovenia this could have another significant effect: it could lower the rate of un-
declared economy, which is a vast problem in Slovenia as pointed out by Nastav (2004), 
and Nastav and Bojnec (2005). It is often so that “unemployed” in Slovenia receive un-
employment benefits as long as possible, but work unofficially at the same time – in such 
way they have two positive financial effects: first, they receive unemployment benefits 
that could be relative high if pre-unemployment wage was high, and second, they receive 
higher wage on their undeclared work, because they do not pay taxes. This topic, regard-
less the fact that is closely connected to the issue discussed in this paper, is a relatively 
unresearched issue in Slovenia and is therefore left for further research.
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